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ABSTRACT 
A model is developed for situations in which consumers 
depend upon producers of a good or service for information which has 
an impact on their demand. Nonsupply sources of information do not 
exist and consumers are forced to rely on comparisons between suppliers 
as their only check on potential fraud. The optimal search strategies 
are characterized and some of the implications for the resulting 
patterns of advice are analyzed. 
TOWARDS A THEORY OF PROFESSIONAL DIAGNOSIS AND SERVICE: 
* CONSUMER BEHAVIOR 
Charles R. Plott and Louis L. Wilde 
California Institute of Technology 
1. Introduction 
Very little is understood about markets in which consumers 
depend upon producers of a good or service for information which has 
an impact on their demand for that good or service. The current 
"state of the art" in economic thought on the subject is summarized 
in the statement that "[t]he provision of joint [information and 
product] implies that some fraud can be successful because of the 
high, if not prohibitive, costs of discovery of the fraud."1 
Unfortunately the analysis based on this observation yields limited 
insights since it focuses on the relationship between non-supplier 
sources of information (e.g. independent experts, knowledgable 
friends, and repeated personal experience) and individual supplier 
responses (e.g. the "client relationship"). It thus ignores one 
of the most natural sources of information which consumers can tap 
to check potential fraud, comparisons between suppliers. In this 
paper we assume that nonsupplier sources of information do not exist, 
and that consumers are therefore forced to rely on comparisons 
between suppliers as their only check on potential fraud. The 
question we ultimately seek to answer is whether, under these 
2 
conditions, competitive pressure will force (uniform) fraudulent 
behavior. As such, the focus of our research is on the market as a 
whole, not on individual agents. 
The model developed in the next section differs from 
traditional models, so an explanation of our motivation for using it 
w1.11 be useful. Our initial investigation of "seller induced demand" 
began with a series of laboratory experiments, reported in Plott and 
Wilde [1980]. In these experiments buyers were given the opportunity 
to purchase one of two products, product "a" or product "b". The 
value of purchasing a was known with certainty but the value of 
purchasing b was random, depending on which of two personalized, 
underlying states of nature was realized. Additional information 
designed to provide a clue as to which state of nature had actually 
been realized for each individual was also provided. In one se~ of 
experiments this information was given directly to buyers. In another 
set, identical in all other respects to the first, this information 
was only given to sellers, but buyers were allowed to shop sellers for 
recommendations as well as low prices. Sellers were not constrained 
in any way regarding the nature of their recommendations to buyers. 
One of the crucial features of these experiments was that 
no additional information was provided to help buyers learn how 
well they or the sellers assessed clues. In the case where only 
sellers were given clues this forced buyers to rely on comparisons 
between sellers as their only means of obtaining a check on 
accuracy or veracity. Since, in our laboratory experiments, l'search" 
costs" were relatively low, this generated substantial shopping 
activity. We start the present paper with a theoretical model of 
consumer behavior under these circumstances. 
The type of real-world markets we had in mind when we 
designed the experiments described above includes medical services, 
auto repairs, and the like. Typically one observes very little 
shopping in these markets. Instead consumers often rely heavily on 
the opinions of friends or other indirect sources of information. 
Given these observations, one might well question the usefulness 
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of a model characterizing optimal buyer behavior based on the 
assumption that sellers are their only source of information. There 
are two reasons why such a theoretical exercise is of interest. The 
first reason is that a formal model can help us understand why buyers 
might not wish to engage in much shopping in these markets. The most 
immediate explanation for this behavior is that search costs are 
high, but the model developed in the next section will uncover other 
factors which might be important. The second reason why the exercise 
is of interest is that it will help us understand ways in which 
sellers might respond to buyer behavior in these markets. 
It is this last issue with which we are most concerned. 
While this paper will not present a full equilibrium model it will 
construct a reasonable argument, based on our model of buyer behavior, 
that sellers have a strong incentive to match the recommendations of 
other sellers in the market. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents our 
formal model of buyer behavior, taking the link between states of the 
world and seller recommendations as given. Section III uses the 
<. 
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results of section II to establish properties of buyer and seller 
behavior. A concluding section offers several comments respecting 
limitations and extensions of our current model, as well as potential 
applications of the entire methodology. 
II. A Formal Model of Consumer Behavior 
Consider a situation in which a consumer demands one of two, 
services; a or b. Any seller in the market can provide either service. 
The consumer's problem is to decide which service he or she needs and 
to purchase that service at a low price. The solution to this 
problem is modeled as a stopping rule. In order to focus on the 
effects of asymmetric information regarding the underlying states of 
the world, we assume no price variation across sellers. Let pa = 
the price of serviceaand pb =the price of service b. As a further 
simplifying assumption we assume there are precisely two states of 
the world, A and B. The relationship between states of the-world 
and the value of services will be made precise below, but the 
fundamental assumption of the model is that sellers have information . 
not possessed by the consumer regarding the true state of the world. 
The consumer may or may not wish to use this information, depending 
on how he or she feels about sellers' abilities and/or motives. 
When state of the world A is realized we will say the 
consumer is in demand state A. When state of the world B is 
realized we will say the consumer is in demand state B. Let q 
the consumer's subjective estimate that he or she is in demand state 
A and 1 - q = the consumer's subjective estimate that he or she is 
_J. 
.,_'·' 
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_ in demand state B. Information supplied by a seller comes in the 
same form; that is, we let p = a seller's subjective estimate that 
the consumer is in demand state A and 1 - p = a seller's subjective 
estimate that the consumer is in demand state B. Further, we let 
g(pjy) represent the consumer's beliefs regarding the likelihood 
a seller will predict the pair (p,l-p) given the true state of 
2 
-demand is y (where p E [0,1] and y E {A,B}). 
Several variations of this model are obvious. For 
example, one could assume the consumer has a prior distribution over 
·q and_l- q, and that he.or she uses information supplied by sellers 
to update this prior to yield a_posterior distribution. We have 
tmplicitly assumed that the only admissable class of such 
distributions are degenerate. This has yielded a number of strong 
results and the additional predictive power of variations has not 
appeared worth their costs. 3•4 
The payoff to _the consumer from purchasing either service 
depends on the consumer's true state of demand. Let v(x,p Jy) = the 
X 
indirect utility attained by purchasing service x at price px when 
the true state of demand is y (where x E {a,b} and y E {A,B}). Finally, 
let the unit cost of visiting sellers be constant at c, measured in 
the same units as v. 
Make the following assumptions. 
Al) ag(pjA)/ap>O and ag(pjB)/dp<O for all p E [0,1]. 
Moreover, O<g(OjA)<g(OjB)<l and O<g(ljB)<g(ljA)<l. 
A2) v(a,pajA) >v(a,pajB); v(b,pbjB) >v(b,pbjA). 
6 
A3) c~O. 
Assumption 1 implies a type of monotonicity with respect tp 
the information provided by sellers: a seller is more likely to 
predict a high probability that the consumer is in demand state A if 
the consumer is in fact in demand state A than if the consumer is in 
fact in demand state B. Similarly, a seller is more likely to predict 
a high probability that the consumer is in demand state B if the 
consumer is in fact in demand state B than if the consumer is in 
demand state A. Assumption 1 also implies g(piy) > 0 for p E [0,1] and 
y E {A,B}. This is stronger than we need but it simplifies several J, 
proofs. 
Assumption 1 is based on the underlying assumption that the 
link between demand states and predictions is imperfect. This can be 
due to two factors. First, sellers may have to base their predictions_. 
on clues which are themselves randomly linked to demand states (as 
in the experiments studied in Plott and Wilde [1980]. Second, sellers 
may find it in their interest to not make "sure-thing" predictions 
(i.e., p = 0 or p = 1) even if they feel certain of the true demand' 
state. This suggests that ultimately the form of g should be 
endogenous. That is, sellers should respond to consumer information 
acquisition and evaluation strategies in making their predictions. 
Section 3 discusses this issue in more detail. However, we emphasize·· 
here that Assumption 1 is the single most important assumption made 
in this paper. 
Assumption 2 simply stftes that pa and pb are such that-it 
is always preferable (from the consumer's point of view) to purchase 
,, 
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service a in demand state A and service b in demand state B. 
Assumption 3 is obvious. 
··r- ·' 
The final element of our model of consumer behavior links 
,_. 
r the consumer's prior subjective estimates of the probabilities of 
'' being in demand state A or B with seller provided information. Let 
F(p,q) be the consumer's "posterior" subjective estimate of being 
in demand state A given a seller predicts that probability to be p 
when the consumer's prior subjective estimate of being in demand 
state A is q. 
g(piA)q 
A4) F(p,q) 
g(piA)q + g(piB)(l-q) 
Assumption 4 is based on the premise that the consumer acts 
as a classical Bayesian in forming new expectations based on seller 
information. The following three lemmas follow directly from (Al) 
. through (A4) and are stated without proof. They will be useful 
later in deducing properties of seller behavior (e.g. the corollaries 
on page 17). 
Lemma 1: F(p,q) is increasing in q. It is concave when g(piA)< 
g(piB), linear when g(piA) = g(piB), and convex when g(piA) >g(piB). 
Lemma 2: F(p,q) > q as g(p A) > g(p !B). 
< < 
Lemma 3: F(p2 ,F(p1 ,q)): q as g(p1 iA)g(p2 iA): g(p1 iB)g(p2 iB). 
Formally, the consumer is assumed to maximize expected 
utility net of search costs. This is done by the appropriate choice 
of a stopping rule. The functional·· equation associated with this 
choice is defined by 
W(p,q) 5 -c + max{S(F(p,q)), EW(P,F(p,q))}. 
8 
In this equation W(p,q) is the expected value of following an optimal 
policy when a prediction of p has been received, given q is the 
consumer's prior subjective probability of 'being in demand state A-
(3} 
and S(F(p,q)) is the expected value of stopping and purchasing service 
a orb (depending on which yields a higher,expected payoff) when the, 
consumer's posterior subjective estimate of being in demand state A 
is F(p,q). 
Define S (t) = v(x,p jA)t - v(x,p jB) (1-t) for x E {A,B} 
X X X 
and t E [0,1]. This function gives the expected value of stopping alJ.d, 
purchasing service x when the consumer's subjective estimate of being 
in demand state A is t. We make one final assumption to keep the ·_, 
problem nontrivial. 
A5) v(a,pa jB) < v(b,pb jB); v(b,pb jA) < v(a,pa jA). 
Lemma 4: There exists t* E (0,1) such that 
s (t) 
{
SB (t) 
SA (t) if t ::: t* 
if t ::: t* 
Proof: (A2) implies SA and SB are both linear with S~ > 0 and S~ < 0. 
(AS) guarantees their intersecti9n is interior to the unit interval. 
q.e.d. 
'• '· 
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Figure 1 illustrates one possible form of S(t) along with t*. Note 
[Figure 1] 
that Assumption 2 and Assumption 5 together imply it is always better 
for the consumer to match purchases with demand states. They do not 
imply anything about v(a,p jA) vis-a-vis v(b,pbjB) or v(a,p jB) vis-a-
. a a 
vis v(b,pbjA). 
The infinite horizon functional equation (3) is the key to 
understanding optimal consumer behavior in this model. To analyze it 
,directly is difficult, though, so we begin with a sequence of finite 
horizon problems. Define 
W0 (p,q) = -c + S(F(p,q)). 
This function gives the expected value of following an optimal policy 
when no further sampling is possible, a prediction of p has just been 
received, and the consumer's prior subjective estimate of being in 
demand state A is q. In a similar way, we define 
W (p,q) = -c + max{S(F(p,q)), EW 1 (P,F(p,q))} n n-
for n =:: 1. Consider first w0. 
The form of w0 obviously depends crucially on the form of 
S(F(p,q)), Little can be said about S(F(p,q)), however, since S' 
can be positive or negative, arid F is concave in q when g(pjA) =:: 
(4) 
(5) 
g(pjB) and convex in q when g(pjA)::: g(pjB) (see Lemma 1). Fortunately, 
_the important function is not w0 (p,q), but rather EW0 (P,q). 
For notational convenience define 
h(p,q): g(pjA)q + g(pjB)(l-q). (6) 
v(b,pbjB) 
v(a,p jB) 
a 
0 t* 
Figure 1: S(t) and t* 
1 
v(a,p jA) 
a 
v(b,pbjA) 
-10 
;. 
Then (4) implies 
EW0 (p,q) 
1 
-c + Js(F(p,q))h(p,q)dp. 
0 
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Lemma 5: EW0 (P,q) is convex in q. Moreover, it is piecewise linear. 
(7) 
Proof: The proof of this lemma is straightforward but tedious. It is 
presented in the appendix. q.e.d. 
Remark 1: Define a "continue set" by r0 = {q E [O,l]j EW0 (P,q)~S(q)}. 
Lenuna 5 plus the facts that ClEW0 (P,O)/Clq > S' (0) and ClEW0 (P,l)/Clq < 
S' (1) imply r 0 is compact and connected (if it is nonempty). Horeover, 
EW0 (P,O)=S(O)-c and EW0 (P,l)=S(l)-c so that for c small enough 
(but not necessarily zero), r 0 _,; ljJ. The proof of this claim is 
straightforward and can be found in the appendix. 
[Figure 2] 
Figure 2 illustrates the properties of r 0 • Also obvious 
from Figure 2 (and Remark 1) is the following. 
Remark 2: If c is small enough that r O #: ¢, then t* E r O •. 
We now turn to the case where a prediction of p has just 
been received, the consumer's prior subjective estimate of being in 
demand state A is q, and at most one more seller can be sampled. 
Define, as in (5), 
Wl(p,q) -c + max{S(F(p,q)), EW0(P,F(p,q))}. (8) 
v(b,pbiB) 
S(O) - c 
0 
S(t) 
tB 
Figure 2: 
EW0 (P,q) 
t* tA 
ro 
Properties of r 0 
1 
v(a,p lA) 
a 
S(l) - c 
q 
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In order to proceed to the infinite horizon via an induction 
argument, we need to establish properties of EW1 similar to those 
established for EW0 . Consider the case when r 0 # ~. 6 Let tA = 
max{qEr0 } and tB = min{qEr0 } (see figure 2). Define TIA(q) via 
F(TIA(q),q) = tA and TIB(q) via F(TIB{q),q) = tB. Then 
'ITB(q) 'ITA(q) 
EW1 (P,q) = ~SB(F(p,q))h(p,q)dp + JIE'Wo(P,F(p,q)) 
0 TIB(q) 
Hence 
ClEW1 (P,q) 
Clq 
'ITB(q) 
1 
+ j(sA(F(p,q))h(p,q)dp, 
'ITA (q) 
fisB(F(p,q))F2 (p,q)h(p,q) + SB(F(p,q))\ (p,q)]dp 
0 
'ITA(q) 
(9) 
+ J ClEW0(P,F{p,q)) [ Clq F2 (p,q)h(p,q) + EW0(P,F(p,q))h2 (p,q)]dp 
'ITB(q) 
1 
+ ~ [SA_(F(p,q))F2 (p,q)h(p,q) + SA(F(p,q))h2 (p,q)]dp, 
'ITA{q) 
Differentiating again, 
14 
2 (l EW1 (P,q) 
TIB(q) 
= ~SB(F(p,q))[F22 (p,q)h(p,q) + 2F2(p,q)h2 (p,q)]dp Clq2 
TI A (q) 2 
J Cl EW0 (P,F(p,q)) + Clc [F22(p,q)h(p,q) + 2F2(p,q)h2(p,q)]dp 
TIB(q) 
1 
+ fsA(F(p,q))[F 22 (p,q)h(p,q) + 2F2(p,q)h2(p,q)]dp 
TIA(q) 
+ [SB(tB)F2 (wB(q),q)h(TIB(q),q) + SB(tB)h2 (wB(q),q)]TIB(q) 
ClEW0 (P,tA) 
+ [ Clq F2 (wA(q),q)h(TIA(q),q) + EW0(P,tA)h2 (wA(q),q)]TIA(q) 
[SA(tA)F2 (wA(q),q)h(TIA(q),q) + SA(tA)h2 (wA(q),q)]Til(q) 
ClEW (P,tB) 
- [ ~q F2(TIB(q) ,q)h(TIB(q) ,q) + EWO(p,tB)~(TIB(q) ,q)]'ITB(q). 
2 2 The first three terms in a EW1 (P,q)/Clq are clearly all zero. Hence 
2 (l, EW1 (P,q) ClEW0 (P,tB) 2 =·wB(q) (<sB(tB) - )F2 (wB(q) ,q)h(wB(q) (lq ~n 
+ (SB(tB) - EW0(P,tB))h2 (wB(q),q)) 
+ TI' ( ) ~(ClEWO(P,t ) Aq~--A Clq - SA(tA))F2(TIA(q),q)h(TIA(q),q) 
+ (EW0 (P,tA)....: SA(tA))h2 (wA(q),q>]. 
15 
But by definition SA(tA) = EW0 (P,tA) and SB(tB) = EW0(P,tB). Hence 
2 Cl EW1 (P,q) 
al 
ClEWO (P, tB) . 
wB(q) [<sB(tB) - )F2 (wB(q),q)h(TIB(q),q)) Clq 
~ClEW (P,tA) J 
+ Til(q)L( OClq . - Sl(tA))F2(TIA(q),q)h(wA(q),q). 
It is clear from Remark 1 that S'B(tB) - aEW0(P,tB)/aq < 0 and 
aEW0(P,tA)/aq- Sl(tA) < 0. Moreover F2(wx(q),q)h(Tix(q),q) > 0 for 
xE{A,B}. Thus, if TI~(q) < 0 for q E [0,1] and x E {A,B}, we would 
have EW1 (P,q) piecewise convex. In fact this is guaranteed by (Al). 
Remark 3: (Al) is somewhat stronger than it might appear. It 
implies, for example, that g(pjq) is continuous and differentiable 
for all p E [0,1] and q E {A,B}. These facts guarantee EW1 (P,q) is 
differentiable and is therefore convex (see the appendix for a formal· 
proof of this assertion). 
Remark 4: While EW1 (P,q) is convex in q, it is not piecewise linear. 
However, as in Remark 1, it is easy to show that aEW1 (P,O)/aq = 
aEW0 (P,O)/aq > S'(O) and aEW1 (P,l)/aq = aEW0(p,l)/aq > S'(l). Hence 
the "continue set" for the one-period problem, r1 = {q E [0,1] jEW1 (P,q) 
~ S(q)}, is compact and connected (if it is nonempty). Also, 
EW1 (P,O) = EW0(P,O) = S(O)- c and EW1 (P,l) = EW0(p,l) = S(l)- c. 
Remark 5: It is trivial that EW1 (P,q)~EW0 (P,q) for all qE [0,1]. 
Thus if r1 ;.!cp, t*Ef1 . 
Based on the above lemmas and remarks, an induction argu-
ment which extends those results to any finite problem as defined 
by equation (5) is straightforward. We state the following 
theorem without proof. Note the continue set for then-period 
problem is defined as r : {q E [O,l]IEW (P,q)::: S(q)}. 
n n 
Theorem 1: Assume (Al) through (AS) hold. Then the following is 
true for all n ::: 0. 
1) EWn (p,q) is convex for all q E [0,1]. 
2) Wn+l (p,q)::: Wn (p,q) for all p E [0,1] and q E [0,1]. 
3) EWn(P,O)=S(O)-c; EWn(P,l)=S(l)-c. 
4) ClEWn+l (P,O)/Clq = ClEW0 (P,O)/Clq > S' (0); 
ClEWn+l (P ,1) /Clq = ClEWO (P ,1) /Clq < S' (1). 
5) rn is compact and connected; rn~rn+l; if rn f. <P 
then t* E r . 
n 
16 
The ultimate usefulness of the results given in Theorem 1 
is in establishing properties of the solution to the infinite horizon 
problem defined by the functional equation (3). We would like to 
show (i) a solution exists, (ii) the solution is unique, and (iii) 
its expected value (with respect to P) taken as a function of q is 
convex. 
Consider the sequence of functions {W (p,q)}00 0 . This n n= 
sequence is increasing and bounded above. Hence it converges point-
wise to some limit function, say W(p,q). We claim W(p,q) is a 
solution to (3), it is the unique continuous solution, and it has 
17 
similar properties as those ascribed to the solutions of the finite 
problems in Theorem 1. Note the continue set for the infinite 
problem is defined by r: {q E [O,lJIEW(P,q) ':::· S(q)}). 
Theorem 2: Assume (Al) through (AS) hold. Let W(p,q) = lim W (p,q) 
n+oo n 
for all (p,q) E [0,1] x [0,1]. Then W(p,q) is the unique continuous 
solution to (3). Moreover: 
1) EW(P,O) is convex for all q E [0,1]. 
2) EW(p,O) = S(O)- c; EW(P,l) = S(l)- c. 
3) ClEW(P, 0) /Clq = ClEWO (P, 0) /Clq > S' (0). 
ClEW(p ,1) /Clq = ClEWO (P ,1) /Clq < S' (1). 
4) r is compact and connected. If r f. <P, then t* E r. 
Proof: That W(p,q) exists and solves (3) is trivial (simply take the 
limit on both sides of (5) and note limEWn(P,q) = EW(p,q) by the 
n+~ 
Lebegue Dominated Convergence Theorem). The proof of uniqueness follows 
as a straightforward extension of a result originally due to MacQueen 
and Miller [1960]. Properties (1) through (4) are obvious. 
q.e.d. 
[Figure 3) 
Theorem 2 describes the fundamental properties of the 
consumer's optimal strategy (illustrated in Figure 3). While the 
arguments used herein to establish properties (1) through (4) rely 
heavily on the assumptions that og(piA)/op > 0 and agCpiB)/op < 0 
for p E [0,1], the theorem holds for more specialized cases. For 
.... 
S(O) = v(b,pb[B) 
S(O) - c 
v(a,p [B) 
a 
EW(P,q) 
.) ......... '-._1 
_.... I ""'-.. 
- .......- ___.... I I ', 
I I ' 
I I 
vr'l..: 
......... 
' ~ ... . .;"""" 
'___..... ' 
0 __) .._,_...., '---v-J 1 
stop a~d buy r 
continue 
sampling 
stop and 
buy A 
Figure 3: The Optimal Strategy 
S(l) = v(a,p [A) 
a 
S(l) - c 
v(b,pb[A) 
q 
18 
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example, if g(ply) = 0 for all p E (0,1) and yE {A,B}, then EW(p,q) 
is still convex so that our primary qualitative results still hold. 
This latter case is interesting because it describes a situation in 
7 
which only "sure-thing" predictions are made by sellers. 
We close this section by stating two corollaries of Theorem 
2 which reveal some nonintuitive properties of the consumer's optimal 
strategy; 
Corollary 1: Assume q E r. Then S(F(p,q))?::: EW(P,F(p,q)) implies 
S(F(p,q)) = SB(F(p,q)) iff g(piA) ~ g(piB) and S(F(p,q)) = SA(F(p,q)) 
iff g(piA)?::g(piB). 
This corollary has a natural interpretation. In it we 
assume the consumer has a prior subjective estimate of the probability 
of being in demand state A such that it pays to sample another seller. 
However, the consumer next receives a prediction which leads him or 
her to stop sampling. The service purchased will then be consistent 
with the final prediction in the following way: Service a is 
preferred (strictly) to service b if and only if the prediction 
"favors" demand state A in the sense that g (pI A) > g (pI B), the consumer 
is indifferent between service a and service b if and only if 
g(piA) =g(piB),~ and service b is preferred (strictly) to service a 
if and only if the prediction "favors" demand state B in the sense 
that g(piB) > g(piA). 
Corollary 2: Assume q E rand F(p1 ,q) E r. Then S[F(P2 ,F(P1 ,q))] 
?::: EW(P,F(P2 ,F(p1 ,q))] implies S(F(p2 ,F(p1 ,q))] = SB(F(p2 ,F(p,q))] 
iff g(p
1
1A)g(p2 1A) < g(p1 1 B)g(p21 B) and S(F(p2 ,F(p1 ,q))] 
SA(F(p2 ,F(p1 ,q))] iff g(p1 1A)g(p2 1A) > S(p1 1B)g(p2 1B). 
20 
Corollary 2 is an extension of Corollary 1 which, like it, 
has a natural interpretation. We again assume the consumer has a 
prior subjective estimate of the probability of being in demand 
state A such that it pays to sample another seller. In this case, 
however, the consumer receives a prediction which leads him or her 
to sample yet again. The second sample yields a prediction which 
induces the consumer to stop (i.e. F(p1 ,q) Er but F(p2 ,F(p1 ,q)) 
?::: EW[P,F(p2 ,F(p1 ,q))] for some p1 and p2). In this case the service 
purchased will be consistent with the final two predictions in the 
following manner: the consumer prefers service a if and only if 
the two predictions "favor" service a in the sense that 
g(p1 1A)g(p2 1A) >g(p1 IB)g(p2 1B), the consumer is indifferent between 
purchasing service a and service b if and only if g(p1 1A)g(p2 1A) = 
9 g(p1 1B)g(p2 IB), and the consumer prefers service b if and only if 
the final two predictions "favor" service b in the sense that 
g(pliA)g(p21A) < g(pliB)g(p21B). 
In. the case where g(ply) = 0 for all p E (0,1) andy E {A,B}, 
Corollary 2 implies that if the consumer stops and buys service a after 
sampling at least two sellers, the last two predictions are either 
<1,1> or <0,1> with the latter being the case only if g(OIA)g(liA) 
> g(OIB)g(liB). But this inequality holds if and only if g(liA) < g(OIB). 
In other words, if sellers make only "sure-thing" predictions, then the 
sequence <0,1> followed by a purchase of a is possible only if sellers 
are believed (by the consumer) to be less likely to be correct when 
predicting demand state A than demand state B. This seems unintuitive, 
but notice that g(liA) < g(OIB) if and only if g(OIA) > g(liB). That 
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is, if sellers tend to be less likely to be correct when predicting 
demand state A than demand state B, then they are also more likely 
to be incorrect when predicting demand state B than demand state A. 
'• 
' 
- Similarly, if the consumer stops and buys b after sampling 
. 
at least two sellers, the last two predictions are either <0,0> or 
<1,0> with the latter being the case only if g(ljA) > g(OjB), or, 
equivalently, g(OjA) < g(ljB). These conditions are just the opposite 
of those noted above, implying that the two situations are mutuall~ 
exclusive. 
III. Properties of Buyer ·and Seller- Behavior 
In the introduction to this paper we offered two reasons 
for developing the model of section II. The first reason was to 
understand why consumers might not wish to engage in much shopping 
in markets such as the one we have modeled. The three primary 
explanations which emerge from the analysis of section II are (1) 
high search costs, (2) little information content in "recommendation~" 
and (3) little value to becoming informed.· 
(1) The effects of high search costs are-obvious. An increase 
in c shifts EW(P,q) down relative to S(q) and reduces the 
size of r. This is as one might expect. Other things 
constant, an increase in c will reduce the expected 
number of sellers sampled prior to purchase. 
(2) The effects of a change in the indirect utility functions 
are also straightforward: an increase in v(a,p jB) or 
a 
v(b,pbjA), or a decrease in v(b,pbjB) or v(a,pajA) will 
.-
..; 
all decrease rand reduce shopping activity (see figure 3). 
This is because all four decrease the benefits of being 
"better" informed, or at least of being more certain of 
the true demand state. 
(3) Finally, consider changes in g(pjA) or g(pjB). If g(pjA) 
1 = g(pjB) for all p E [0,1] then f = ~; there would be no 
search because search is absolutely uninformative. At the 
other extreme, if all the weight of g(pjA) were massed at 
1 and all the weight of g(pjB) were massed at p ~ 0, p 
r (0,1) but it would take only one observation for the 
consumer to decide which service to purchase. As g(pjA) 
and g(pjB) begin to shift from the former case to the 
latter (in some appropriately "smooth" way), r would get 
monotonically larger, but the expected number of sellers 
sampled might rise initially and then fall back to one. 
The second reason for developing the model of section II 
was to understand ways in which sellers might be able to take 
advantage of buyers in markets. such as the one we have modeled. 
To do this most effectively requires a full equilibrium model in 
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which sellers have some control over the veracity of their individual 
predictions. Developing such a model is a very ambitious ·task and 
will not be undertaken herein. However, some initial results can 
be gleaned from the model of section II. 
The first result concerns "second opinions". Suppose a 
buyer comes to a seller, and tlie seller knows the buyer has already 
sampled another seller. This means q E r. In this case it never 
' ' 
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pays the seller to make a prediction interior to [0,1]; that is, 
only "sure-thing" predictions should be made. Whether p = 0 or p = 1 
is more desirable (from the seller's point of view) depends on the· 
relative profits obtainable by selling service a or selling service 
b. 
Determining the optimal prediction (on the basis of expected 
prof;i;t max;i;mization) when the seller does not know whether q E r or 
q ~ r is more difficult. It depends on the seller's estimate of the 
distribution of priors across buyers and the relative profits 
obtainable by selling service a or selling service b. This is one 
~or problem with developing a full equilibrium version of this 
model, its tmplications ultimately depend on ad hoc assumptions 
concerning the distribution of priors. 10 
Some speculations concerning possible equilibria can be 
obtained, however, by using Corollary 1, Corollary 2, and the 
discussion following them. Consider, for example, the case in 
which only "sure-thing" predictions are made, In that case, if a 
sequence of predictions ending in <0,1> results in a purchase of a 
then it is not possible that a sequence of predictions ending in 
<1,0> results in a purchase of b, In effect, not matching the 
previous prediction is a very risky strategy unless the seller knows 
whether the buyer believes g(OIA) > g(liB) or g(OIA) > g(liB); SO 
percent of the time it is guaranteed to not yield a sale! The best 
way to get a sale is to reinforce (i.e. match) the last prediction. 
If all sellers use the same strategies to link demand states with 
recommendations, then deviating from these strategies is unlikely to 
increase expected profits for any given seller. In other words, 
there is likely to be a tendency toward "convergent" recommendations, 
whether or not they are. veracious. 
IV. Conclusion 
-; 
It is a common characteristic of markets in which consumers 
depend upon producers of a good or service for information which has 
an impact on their demand for that good or service that search costs 
are high. High search costs are a special problem in these markets 
.. because "quality" is just as important, perhaps even more important 
than price. Hence if there is not enough shopping to get competitive 
prices, it is hard to believe than there is enough shopping to get a 
competitive outcome with respect to quality. The important policy 
issue here is whether more shopping would yield socially preferable 
market outcomes, with respect to both price and qualit~ 
Once again, our lack of a full equilibrium model limits 
the precision with which we can address this issue, but we have 
gained some useful insights. First, even though we have assumed 
prices for both products are the same across all sellers, it is clear 
that there is little connection between prices and the veracity of 
predictions. In this case, "quality" is not obviously improved by 
increased shopping. Nevertheless, in a more general model, in which 
price was allowed to vary, one would expect prices to fall in 
response to increased shopping. Thus the following question arises: 
if consumers shop primarily to gather information, but that shopping 
activity has a stronger effect on prices than on the quality of 
information, is increasing shopping activity in these markets a 
desirable goal? 
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To answer this question we need to look once again at the 
factors which influence consumer behavior in these markets. In 
particular, the linkage function g(piy) is crucial. We know from 
section III that shopping for quality will be at a minimum when this 
~unction is either totally uninformative or perfectly informative, 
and that shopping for quality will be maximized at some intermediate 
level. In other words, shopping for quality will be maximized when 
consumers believe that producers have some useful information at 
their disposal, but that this information is not perfect. The 
problem is that while shopping for quality is maximized under such 
circumstances, welfare may not be. Since any shopping consumes 
resources, and since it is not obviously related to the quality of 
information provided by the market, it can only be justified if it 
has a substantial impact on prices. Moreover, even if this can 
be established, it is no answer to the problem of obtaining a 
competitive outcome with respect to quality. 
These conclusions are, of course, somewhat tentative. 
However, they do suggest that the kind of markets we have been 
considering in this paper may operate in fundamentally different 
ways than other markets in which information is not tied so closely 
to product. 
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1. Darby and Karni [1973, p. 68]. 
2. That is, g(piy) is a conditional probability density function. 
3. See Calvert [1979] who explores some of these variations of this 
model and uses a similar methodology to describe voting behavior. 
4. We also assume the link between true states of demand and 
sellers' predictions, g(piy), is stable, One generalization 
would be to let this function be sensitive to the actual 
sequence of seller. predictions. Another generalization is to 
let g(piy) be sel+er specific. That is, the consumer could 
sample a producer, observe that producer's entire linkage 
· function, and then decide whether to purchase a recommendation 
from that producer. 
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5. An equivalent formulation of the functional equation is to write 
V(p,q) = max{S(F(p,q)), EV(P,F(p,q) - c}. 
It is easy to see that V(p,q) = W(p,q) - c. 
6. If cis large enough that r0 = ~ the_problem is trivial since 
w1 (p,q) = -c + S(F(p,q)) = w0 (p,q) in that case. 
7. See the comments following Theorem 2.and Section III. 
8. Note this case could never arise since g(pJA) = g(pJB) means 
that F(p,q) = q so that the consumer would never choose to stop 
and purchase either a or b under these conditions. 
9. Again, g(p1 JA)g(p2 JA) = g(p1 JB)g(p2 JB) means that F(p2 ,F(p1 ,q)) 
= q so that the case of indifference would never arise. 
10. For a discussion of this problem in the context of a price-
search model see Wilde and Schwartz [1979]. 
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APPENDIX 
Lemma 5: EW0 (P,q) is convex in q. Moreover, it is piecewise 
linear. 
Proof of Lemma 5: Using (7), 
aEW0(P,q) 
dq 
2 a EW0 (P,q) 
aq2 
Define 
1 
= ~[S'(F(p,q))F2 (p,q)h(p,q) + S(F(p,q))h2 (p,q)]dp, 
0 
I 
= J[s'(F(p,q))[F22 (p,q)h(p,q) + 2F2 (p,q)h2 (p,q)]dp. 
0 
ap(q) = r 22 (p,q)h(p,q) + 2F2(p,q)h2 (p,q). 
From (2), 
F22 (p,q) 
2g(piA)g(piB)[g(piB) -g(piA)] 
[g(piA)q + g(piB)(l-q)J 3 
-2g(piA)g(piB)h2(p,q) 
2 [g(piA)q + g(piB)(l-q)] h(p,q) 
Hence 
and thus 
a (q) p 
A-2 
-2g(piA)g(piB) h2 (p,q) 
[g(piA)q + g(piB)(l-q)]2 + 2F2(p,q)h2(p,q) 
g(piA)g(piB) J 2h2(p,q)~2(p,q)- [g(piA)q + g(piB)(l-q)]2 
0, 
2 a EW0 (P,q) ~'(F(p,q))ap(q)dp 
0 
0. 
aq2 
The argument that EW0 (P,q) is convex is straightforward but 
tedious. Define 
QA = {q E [0,1] I F(p,q) > t* for all p E [0,1]} 
QB = {q E [0,1] I F(p,q) < t* for all p E [0,1]} 
QAB = {q E [0,1] I q I QA and q ¢ QB}. 
The set QA includes those prior probabilities for which ~ prediction 
will yield a posterior probability that would induce the consumer to 
purchase service a were he or she to stop sampling sellers. The set 
QB is defined in an analogous way. The set QAB includes those prior 
probabilities which are not in QA or QB (i.e. those prior probabilities 
for which seller provided information truly matters). It is clear that 
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QA f ¢1 f QB since F(p,O) = 0 for all p E [0,1] and F(p,l) = 1 for all 
pE [0,1]. Moreover, QAB f ¢1 since t*E QAB. 
Also define 
a 1 = v(a,paiA) - v(a,paiB) > 0 
a 2 = v(a,paiB) > 0 
b1 = v(b,pbiA) - v(b,pbiB) < 0 
b 2 = v(b,pbiB) > o. 
Then by definition, SA(q) = a1 q + a 2 and SB(q) = b1q + b 2 . Finally, 
define rp(q) = F2 (p,q)h(p,q) + F(p,q)h2(p,q) .. since h 22 (p,q) = 0 
for all q E [0,1], r• (q) = cr (q) = 0 for all q E [0,1]. In fact p p 
straightforward computation shows r (q) = g(p lA). 
p 
Claim 1: 
al 
a 1 + [(b1-a1 ) + (b2 -a2 )]G(TI(q) lA) 
if q E QA 
Clffi:l0 (P,q) 
Clq + (b2 -a2 )G(rr(q)IB) if qEQAB 
if q E QB 
where 'IT(q) is defined by F(TT(q) ,q) = t* and G(p lx) is the c.d.f. 
associated with g(plx). 
Proof of Claim 1: 
Consider q E QA. Here 
1 
so that 
ClEW0 (p,q) 
Clq 
EW0 (P,q) =j(sA(F(p,q))h(p,q)dp 
0 
1 
= Jlrs~(F(p,q))F2 (p,q)h(p,q) + SA(F(p,q))h2 (p,q)]dp 
0 
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1 
a 1fr.F2 (p,q)h(p,q) + F(p,q)h2 (p,q)]dp + a 2fh2 (p,q)dp 
0 0 
1 1 
a1Jrpdp + a 2j[g(piA)- g(piB)]dp 
0 0 
al 
The result for q E QB follows analogously. The result for q E QAB follows 
as the above with the observation that p~rr(q) implies S(F(p,q)) = 
SB(F(p,q)) and p~TT(q) implies S(F(p,q)) = SA(F(p,q)). 
Since EW0 (p,q) is co~tinuous in q, the final step of the 
proof of the Lemma is given by the observations that a 1 :> 0 > b1 
and 
b2 > a 2 > 0. q.e.d. 
Remark 1: Besides being convex and piecewise linear, aEW0 (P,O)/ao 
> S'(O) and aEW
0
(P,l)/dq < S'(l). Hence r0 :: {qE [O,l]j EW0 (P,q) 
~ S(q)} is compact and conn~ted (if it is nonempty). Moreover, 
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EW
0
(P,O) = s-(o)- c and EW
0
(P,l) = S(l)- c so that for c small enough 
(but not necessarily zero)~ r 0 "' cp. 
Proof of Remark 1: Consider q = 0. By definition 
EW0 (P,O) 
Also, from Lemma 5, 
dEW{) (P, q) 
aq 
1 
-c + L S(F(p,O))h(p,O)dp 
1 
-c + S(O) Lg(pjB)dp 
= -c + S(O) 
1 
fis·'(F(p,O))F2 (p,O)h(p,O) + S(F(p,O)h2 (p,O)]dp 
0 
1 
= l[s'(O)g(pjA)g(pjB) + S(O)(g(pjA)-g(pjB))]dp 
0 
1 
= b
1
f[g(pjA) + g(pjA)g(pjB) -g(pjB)]dp 
0 
1 
= b11g(pjA)g(pjB)dp •. ' 
0 
But b1 < 0 and 
1 
0 < fg(pjA)g(pjB)dp < 1. 
0 
Hence aEW0 (P,O)/aq > b1 = S'(O). 
The result for q = 1 follows analogously. Properties 
of ro are obvious from inspection of figure 2. 
It was claimed on page 14 that EW1 (p,q) is differentiable 
Proof of Claim: Consider the following: EW1 (P ,q + o) - EW1 (P ,q) 
'ITB(q+o) 
JsBCFCp,q + o))h(p,q + o)dp + 
0 
'ITA Cq+o) 
JEW0 CP,F(p,q + o))h(p,q + o)dp 
'ITB(q+o) 
'JTB(q) 
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q.e.d. 
1 
+ f SA (F(p,q + o))h(p,q + o)dp - fsB(F(p,q))h(p,q)dp 
'ITA Cq+o) 0 
'JTA(q) 1 
- JEW0 (P,F(p,q))h(p,q)dp - fsA(F(p,q))h(p,q)dp 
'ITB(q) 'JTA(q) 
'JTB(q+o) 'JTB(q) 
= J[sB(F(p,q + o))- sB(F(p,q))h(p,q)Jdp - JsB(F(p,q))h(p,q)dp 
o 'JTB(q+o) 
'ITA Cq+o) -
+ J[EW0 (P,F(p,q + o))h(p,q + o)- EW0 (P,F(p,q))h(p,q)]dp 
'JTB(q) 
Hence, 
1TB (q) 1T A (q) 
+ J EW0 (P,F(p,q + o))h(p,q + o)dp - JEW0 (P,F(p,q) 
1TB(q+o) 1TA(q+o) 
1 
+ JsA (F(p,q+ o))h(p,q + o) - SA (F(p,q))h(p,q)]dp 
1TA(q) 
1 
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- JsA (F(p,q + o))h(p,q + o)dp. 
1T A (q+o) 
EW1 (P ,q + o) - EW1 (P ,q) lim -=----------=---
o-+0 o 
1TB(q) 
hs~(F(p,q))F2.(p,q)h(p,q) + SB(F(p,q))h2 (p,q)]dp 
1TA (q) EW0 (P,F(p,q+ o))h(~,q + o) 
+ f[lim 
Jlo+o _ o 
1TB(q) 
- EW0(P,F(p,q))h(p,q)J ·~ 
+ 
1 
f(sl(F(p,q))F2(p,q)h(p,q) + SA(F(p,q))h2 (p,q)]dp. 
1TA(q) 
But EW0 (P,F(p,q)) is constant for p E [1TB(q), 1TA(q)]. Hence 
aEW1 (P,x)/aq is well-defined as x goes to q from above or below. The 
desired result then follows from the analogous observation that 
. EW1(p,q)- EW1 (p,q) 1~m~~------~---
o+O o 
1TB(q) 
hs~(F(p,q))F2(p,q)h(p,q) + SB(F(p,q))h2 (p,q))dp 
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1T (q) 
J[A EW0 (P,F(p,q))h(p,q)- EW0 (P,F(p,q- o))h(p,q- o)J + [lim dp o+o o 
1TB(q) 
1 
+ f(sl(F(p,q))F2 (p,q)h(p,q) + SA(F(p,q))h2 (p,q)]dp. 1TA(q) 
